A group of n users want to run an asynchronous protocol π, whose length L is unknown a priori. An oblivious bit-flipping adversary, who does not have access to the private random bits of the users, enters the scene with unbounded budget T . This paper presents an algorithm that compiles the noise-free protocol π into a robust protocol π that can deal with this adversary and achieve successful communication with probability 1 − O (1/n), sending O ((L + T ) log n(L + T )) bits in expectation. It does so without any a priori knowledge of L or T . Our result is, hence, within logarithmic factors of the optimal.
Introduction
Can an adversary so strong as to have unbounded computation power and a budget that is not known to anyone in advance be handled without a large overhead? Turns out that the answer is in our favor as long as we restrict him from accessing our private random bits. In fact, this tolerance exists even if we are unaware of the total length of communication.
Consider a group of n ≥ 2 users who want to run a noisefree asynchronous protocol π, whose length is unknown a priori. An oblivious bit flipping adversary decides to enter the scene with malicious intentions. Similar to the previous work by Dani et. al [11] , we assume that this adversary chooses π, and which bits to flip on the noisy channels. He knows our algorithm for transforming π to π , however, he neither knows the private random bits of any user, nor the bits sent over the channels, except when it is possible to infer these from knowledge of π and our algorithm.
Since none of the users are aware of this adversary's strategy or how many bits he will flip on the channels, their only defense is through some randomness that he has no control over. We present an algorithm that compiles π into a robust protocol π , which tolerates such an adversary with high probability in n, without incurring a large overhead on part of the users. This algorithm can handle any protocol π, that runs in an asynchronous environment, in a simple decentralized manner and so far, is the first such algorithm to have tackled the multiparty case in this setting.
Our main result can be summarized in the following theorem. Theorem 1.1. For n ≥ 2 users running a noisefree asynchronous protocol π of unknown length L, Algorithm 7 compiles π into a robust protocol π that tolerates an oblivious bit flipping adversary with unknown budget T such that π succeeds with probability 1 − O(1/n) and upon successful termination, sends O ((L + T ) log n (L + T )) bits in expectation.
Related Work
Interactive Communication The problem of interactive communication asks how two parties can run a protocol π over a noisy channel. This problem was first posed by Schulman [33, 34] , who describes a deterministic method for simulating interactive protocols on noisy channels with only a constant-factor increase in the total communication complexity. This work spurred vigorous interest in the area (see [4] for an excellent survey).
Schulman's scheme tolerates an adversarial noise rate of 1/240, even if the adversary is not oblivious. It critically depends on the notion of a tree code for which an exponential-time construction was originally provided. This exponential construction time motivated work on more efficient constructions [5, 30, 26] . There were also efforts to create alternative codes [17, 28] . Recently, elegant computationally-efficient schemes that tolerate a constant adversarial noise rate have been demonstrated [2, 18] . Additionally, a large number of results have improved the tolerable adversarial noise rate [3, 7, 19, 16, 6] , as well as tuning the communication costs to a known, but not necessarily constant, adversarial noise rate [21] .
Our paper builds on a result on interactive communication by Dani et al [11] , which in contrast to previous work, assumes an oblivious adversary, but tolerates an unknown number of bit flips by such an adversary. Their algorithm sends L + O L(T + 1) log L + T bits in expectation. They show that the adversary must be oblivious in order to tolerate unknown T .
Recently, Braverman et al [8] show a lower bound for coding schemes for multiparty interactive communication over synchoronous star networks that suffer from stochastic noise. However, note that the problem we solve in this paper deals with enabling n parties to run an asynchronous protocol in the presence of adversarial noise when both the adversarial budget T and the length of the protocol L is unknown to any of the users. We do not assume any network topology and claim that our algorithm works for all asynchronous protocols π. This is the first result in this area which makes such assumptions and achieves a low cost (within logarithmic factors of the optimal) with a high probability of success.
Rateless Codes Rateless error correcting codes enable generation of potentially an infinite number of encoding symbols from a given set of source symbols with the property that given any subset of a sufficient number of encoded symbols (typically of the order of the number of source symbols), the original source symbols can ideally be recovered. Two examples of such codes are the Fountain codes [25] and the LT codes [29, 24, 22] . Both of these belong to the class of erasure codes, enabling the recovery of the original message from only a subset of the encoded symbols.
Erasure codes do not usually employ any feedback mechanisms other than for stopping transmission [29, 24] and for error detection [22] at the receiver. Additionally, the feedback channel is typically assumed to be noise free. We differ from this model in that we allow the adversary to flip bits on the feedback channel. Additionally, our model of channel noise in both directions is more challenging than is typically assumed for rateless codes. In particular, adversarial bit flips are more difficult to tolerate than erasures.
Asynchrony of π
Recall that a synchronous network is one in which there is a global clock and each message sent in the network takes (exactly) one time step to be transmitted. On the other hand, an asynchronous network is one in which messages may be arbitrarily and adversarially delayed. In particular messages need not be received in the same order as they are sent. However, every message must be eventually delivered in a finite amount of time. Thus, algorithms that runs on an asynchronous network are typically event-driven, which means that after the initial set of message(s), all subsequent messages are generated as responses to received messages. This is for the purpose of maintaining a (partial) order on the chronology of messages. Obviously, these algorithms may be run on synchronous networks, since the latter are special cases of asynchronous networks, where the adversary chooses to deliver all concurrent messages at the same time. However, the reverse is not true, because in an asynchronous network, the processors do not share a common view of the time.
In this paper, we deal with a network of binary private channels. Here, a bit is transmitted on the channel every time step. Thus, these are inherently synchronous and the simulating protocol π can be a synchronous algorithm. On the other hand, since the adversary is free to corrupt the traffic over multiple time steps on some channels, while leaving other channels completely untampered, one can think of π as running on an induced network, and this induced network is asynchronous. Thus π must be able to run on an asynchronous network and be an event-driven algorithm.
Formal Model
Our algorithm takes as input a protocol π which is a sequence of L bits, each of which is transmitted between some pair of users. We require that π must be able to compute the correct output even when its messages are delayed arbitrarily i.e. π is asynchronous. However, unlike any previous work, we do not assume that any user knows L or T at any point of the algorithm. We do not make any assumption about the underlying topology of the network between the users, however, we require that each user knows the total number n of users in the network.
Channel Steps
We assume that all communication in π is synchronous and individual computation is instantaneous. We define a channel step as the amount of time that it takes to send one bit over a channel, assuming it to be the same for all the channels.
Silence on the channel Similar to [11] , when neither user sends on a channel, we say that the channel is silent. In any contiguous sequence of silent channel steps, the bit received on the channel in the first step is set by the adversary for free. By default, the bit received in the subsequent steps of the sequence remains the same, unless the adversary pays for one bit flip each time it wants to change the value of the bit received in any contiguous sequence of silent steps.
Overview of Our Result
Can we adapt the results for bounded noise rate and communication length by guessing the two? One key challenge in this approach is to make all users aware of the guess made without any centralized mechanism, and allow them to adapt to a revised guess in case the previous one underestimates.
One idea is to assume a global clock which ticks every step, and allows all the users to adapt to the new guess after a fixed number of steps, which is only a function of n. If at the time of completion of these steps some users have still not terminated, they continue their future communication with the revised guess of L and T . Our approach makes this possible without the use of any synchronization messages across the network, yet keeping all communication as local to the users as possible.
Another technical challenge is termination. The length of the simulated protocol is unknown, so the users will likely not terminate at the same time. After a user has terminated, it is a challenge for its neighbors to detect this fact based on the bits received over the noisy channel. Our approach makes use of authentication keys, which every user generates randomly for himself and shares with whoever wants to communicate with him. We use this key in a way that it makes unlikely for the adversary to successfully forge messages or silence on the channels, without detection by the affected users. Hence, a sequence of silent channel steps will suffice, with high probability in n, to indicate the users of the termination of their neighbors.
Our main result is stated in Theorem 1.1. The proof of this theorem and details of how we deal with the challenges above are presented in the subsequent sections.
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe a simple algorithm for multiparty interactive communication that works when the knowledge of L is public and T is not more than (nL) 10 . We analyze this algorithm in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe an algorithm for multiparty interactive communication that works for any finite T and L, without any a priori public knowledge of the two. We prove that this algorithm is correct and analyze it for the total number of bits sent in Section 5. Finally, we conclude and give directions for future work in Section 6.
Bounded T -Algorithm
In this section, we describe an algorithm that enables interactive communication between the users when the number of bits flipped by the adversary is bounded as T ≤ (nL) 10 . We claim that the probability of failure and the total number of bits sent in expectation remain same asymptotically as long as T = O (nL) k for some known k ≥ 0.
Overview, Notation and Definitions
Our algorithm is presented in three parts as Algorithms 1, 2 and 3. Algorithms 1 and 2 provide helper functions that are used in Algorithm 3. The overall idea of our main algorithm is simple: each pair of neighboring users communicates over a dedicated channel. As soon as a user has a message for his neighbor, he asks the latter for his key. This key is appended to the message and the tuple, thus obtained, is then encoded using AMD codes [9] and error correcting bits [31] . Upon receipt of this encoded message, any discrepancies are resolved through appropriate resend requests. This goes on until all the messages in π have been communicated to the intended users.
Helper functions
Some helper functions and notation used in our algorithm are described here. We denote by s ∈ u.a.r. S the fact that s is sampled uniformly at random from the set S. We use * as a wildcard to denote the set of all possible binary strings of appropriate length.
Algebraic Manipulation Detection Codes Our algorithm makes critical use of Algebraic Manipulation Detection (AMD) codes from [9] . For a given δ > 0, called the strength of AMD encoding, these codes provide three functions: amdEnc, amdDec and IsCodeword. The function amdEnc (m, δ) creates an AMD encoding of a message m. The function IsCodeword (m, δ) takes a message m and returns true if and only if there exists some message m such that amdEnc (m , δ) = m. The function amdDec (m, δ) takes a message m such that IsCodeword (m, δ) and returns a message m such that amdEnc (m , δ) = m. These functions enable detection of bit corruption in an encoded message with high probability. The following (slightly reworded) theorem from [9] helps establish this:
There exist functions amdEnc, amdDec and IsCodeword, such that for any δ ∈ 0, Error-correction Codes These codes enable us to encode a message so that it can be recovered even if the adversary corrupts a third of the bits. We will denote the encoding and decoding functions by ecEnc and ecDec, respectively. The following theorem, a slight restatement from [31] , gives the properties of these functions. Finally, we observe that the linearity of ecEnc and ecDec ensure that when the error correction is composed with the AMD code, the resulting code has the following properties:
1. If at most a third of the bits of the message are flipped, then the original message can be uniquely reconstructed by rounding to the nearest codeword in the range of ecEnc.
2. Even if an arbitrary set of bits is flipped, the probability of the change not being recognized is at most δ, i.e. the same guarantee as the AMD codes.
This is because ecDec is linear, so when noise η is added by the adversary to the codeword x, effectively what happens is the decoding function ecDec (x + η) = ecDec (x) + ecDec (η) = m + ecDec (η), where m is the AMD-encoded message. But now ecDec (η) is an obliviously selected string added to the AMD-encoded codeword.
Silence We define the function IsSilence (s) to return true iff the string s has fewer than |s|/3 bit alternations. We also define S = {s ∈ {0, 1} | IsSilence (s)}.
Remaining Notation
Message exchange protocols For each message m in π that is sent from some user u to his neighbor v, we define a message exchange protocol for that message to be the sequence of time steps in which u sends m to v in π using the algorithm described below. For the sake of convenience, we assume that there are two bidirectional channels between each pair of (neighboring) users. Both users along these channels use a dedicated channel upon initiating a message exchange protocol. This will cause only a constant multiplicative blowup in the cost of our algorithm.
We assume that in each message exchange protocol, single bit messages will be exchanged between each pair of users that are involved in the communication. Messages in π that are larger than a single bit are sent bit wise, with each bit sent after successful communication of the previous bit. In π , each such message m is appended by a key k of length 2 log nL bits (refer to Fig.1 ). This is then AMD encoded with strength δ = (1/nL) 12 and appended with error correction bits. Finally, sufficient number of random bits are appended to the message to make the total length 92 log nL . These bits are added to ensure that users are unlikely to confuse codewords with silence and that the adversary is unlikely to flip bits of a codeword to forge silence. We denote the final encoded message obtained from this process by ecEnc (amdEnc ((m, k) , δ) ) .
Algorithm Overview

Alice and Bob
We first present the algorithm between two users, referred to as Alice and Bob here. Recall that along every edge that is involved in the communication, each half-duplex channel has a dedicated sender and receiver. While referring to communication along this channel, we call the sender Alice and the receiver Bob. Thus, in each message exchange protocol of the protocol π , if Alice has a message for Bob, they will follow the Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively, for their communication. As mentioned before, only single bit messages will be exchanged in a message exchange protocol, and the next message exchange protocol between them will begin only when the current message exchange protocol has terminated successfully.
Each message exchange protocol between Alice and Bob begins with Alice requesting Bob for a key, through a special codeword KEY?. Upon receiving this key from Bob, Alice encodes her bit along with the key and sends to Bob. If Bob is unable to decode the bit correctly or verify his key, he asks for a resend, through a special codeword RESEND. This goes on until Bob authenticates the bit with his key, after which he terminates. Alice recognizes Bob's termination through silence on the channel, after which she terminates as well.
There are three important ways in which the adversarial bit flips can alter the above scenario. First, when the encoded message Alice sends is corrupted. Then, either Bob is not able to decode the message and is unable to authenticate his key, in which case he asks for a resend; or he is able to authenticate the key in the message but receives a bit that was not sent by Alice.
The other important way in which the adversarial bit flips can alter the ideal scenario is when the resend request from Bob is interpreted as silence by Alice. This happens when the adversary is able to flip the bits in a way that the number of bit alternations in the message from Bob falls below a third of the length of the message. In this case, Alice terminates and Bob either enters an indefinite exchange of resend requests, waiting to hear a message back from Alice; or receives a forged codeword installed by the adversary.
Yet another important way in which the above scenario can be altered is when the adversary is able to guess the key used in the communication between Alice and Bob, and launches a man-in-the-middle attack. We define the occurrence of either of these three cases as a failure event for our algorithm and prove that the probability of failure is O (1/nL) in the next section. Send ecEnc (amdEnc ((KEY?, k a ) , δ)) .
7:
until ( * , k a ) received from Bob Send ecEnc (amdEnc ((b, k b ) , δ)) .
10:
while ¬IsSilence (string on channel from Bob) do 11: if Resend requested then
12:
Send ecEnc (amdEnc ((b, k b ) , δ)) . Stay silent. Stay silent until (KEY?, * ) received from Alice. k a ←Alice' key from the message.
8:
Send ecEnc (amdEnc ((k b , k a ) , δ) ) .
9:
until ¬ (KEY?, * ) received from Alice 10:
Send ecEnc (amdEnc ((RESEND, k b ) , δ)) .
12:
until ( * , k b ) received from Alice
13:
Retrieve the message from Alice.
14:
Terminate Handling Termination In our algorithm, silence on the channel has a critical role to play in handling termination. Bob terminates when he receives a message from Alice that correctly reproduces his key. Alice terminates when she hears silence on the channel from Bob. This condition ensures that 1) Alice is very unlikely to terminate before Bob; and 2) Alice terminates soon after Bob, unless the adversary pays a significant cost to delay this.
Multi user
Having presented the algorithms for Alice and Bob, we now use these in our multiparty setting. The following algorithm compiles protocol π into the desired robust protocol π by sending single bit messages from π in appropriate message exchange protocols. All pairs of users participating in a message exchange protocol will follow the Alice-Bob protocol described above.
Algorithm 3 Main algorithm for bounded T
L ← total length of all messages in π.
3:
B ← bits exchanged in π.
4:
while B is not empty do
5:
A ⊆ U × U × B ← {(u, v, b) : user u has the bit b ready for it's neighbor v.} 6: for each (u, v, b) ∈ A in parallel do
7:
User u executes Alice(b, n, L).
On the appropriate channel.
8:
User v executes Bob(n, L). On the same channel as above.
9:
B ← B \ {b} Bit b removed from B.
10:
Update A.
Bounded T -Analysis
We now prove that with high probability, Algorithm 3 correctly simulates π when T is promised to be at most (nL) 10 , and that upon successful termination, it sends O (L log nL + T ) bits in expectation.
Fix a bit b of π. Let T b be the number of bits flipped by the adversary during Algorithms 1 and 2 for sending b.
Probability of Failure Before proceeding to our proof, we define three bad events.
1. Failure of AMD codes. Some user incorrectly validates a message which has a correct key and updates his knowledge of the message to include bits not in π.
2. Forged silence. The adversary is able to flip bits on a channel that contains a codeword in a way that the recipient of the message receives a string s ∈ S for appropriate .
3. Guessing the key. The adversary is able to guess the key for some user in a message exchange protocol.
We now prove that the probability that any of the above three events occurs is polynomially small in nL. . Note that X 1 , . . . , X b−1 are fully independent. Let X be the number of bit alternations in s. Then, we can write
, by linearity of expectation. Using the multiplicative version of Chernoff bounds in [13] for t ≥ 0, we know that Proof. In the message exchange protocol during which b is sent, Alice terminates before Bob if and only if a resend request from Bob is converted to silence. This will require the adversary to flip some random bits at the end of the resend request to produce a string with few alternations. From Lemma 3.1, this probability is at most 2 − 38 log nL /19 ≤ 1 (nL) 2 , whenever nL ≥ 8. Proof. In the message exchange protocol during which b is sent, Bob does not have the correct guess of b upon termination if the codeword he receives decodes to the bit b = b along with a correct copy of his key. This happens when the adversary is able to successfully tamper the encoded bit into the encoding of b , while preserving Bob's key. Using Theorem 2.1, the probability of such an event is at most δ = 1 nL 12 .
Lemma 3.4. In Algorithms 1 and 2 for sending bit b, the adversary is able to correctly guess the keys k a or k b with probability at most
Proof. The adversary has no access to the private random bits of any user. Hence, he is able to guess the 2 log nL -bit key with probability no more than 2 − 2 log nL ≤ 1/ (nL) 2 . Hence, taking a union bound over the two users involved in the exchange of b, this probability is at most
Lemma 3.5. In Algorithms 1 and 2 for sending bit b, upon successful termination of both Bob and Alice, the total number of codewords exchanged before Bob terminates is at most 3 +
Proof. The number of encoded codewords include three mandatory codewords (two for the key exchange and one for the message) along with some number of key (resend) requests, message resend requests and their replies. Assume that the adversary forces a total of k such requests for some k ≥ 0. Then, by Theorem 2.2, he must flip at least (92k log nL) /3 ≥ 30k log nL bits. For each request, a reply codeword will be sent along the appropriate channel. Hence, the total number of codewords sent by the algorithm is 2k + 3. Thus, using T M ≥ 30k log nL, we get k ≤ T M 30 log nL , which bounds the total number of codewords exchanged by 3 + T M 15 log nL . Lemma 3.6. In Algorithms 1 and 2 for sending bit b, the AMD codes fail with probability at most
Proof. In the message exchange protocol during which b is sent, using Theorem 2.1, each encoded codeword fails with probability δ = 1 (nL) 12 . Thus, using Lemma 3.5 with T M ≤ (nL) 10 and union bound over the number of codewords exchanged by the algorithm, the AMD codes fail with probability at most Lemma 3.7. Algorithm 3 succeeds with probability at least 1 − 8 nL . Proof. For any bit b in π, using Lemmas 3.2, 3.4 and 3.6, the union bound over the three bad events gives us that the probability of failure is at most
2 . Thus, taking a union bound over all bits in π, which can be at most L in number, we get the total probability of failure to be at most 8 15 log nL . Once Bob terminates, Alice sends codewords on the channel as long as she does not hear silence, i.e. intercept a string with few bit alternations. Hence, the total number of codewords sent by Alice after Bob's termination is at most
Thus, the total number of bits sent by the algorithm, in expectation, is no more than
Lemma 3.9. Upon successful termination, Algorithm 3 sends O (L log nL + T ) bits in expectation.
Proof. The number of bits sent in π is at most L. Hence, using Lemma 3.8 and accounting for the constant multiplicative blowup due to multiple channels between pairs of users, the total number of bits sent by Algorithm 3 is b∈π O (log nL + T b ) = O (L log nL + T ).
Unbounded T and unknown L -Algorithm
Algorithm 3 uses messages of size 92 log nL , with keys of length 2 log nL to authenticate the messages. Each of these has O 1/(nL) 2 chance to fail due to either of the failure events. However, when T is large and the length L is unknown to the users, this message size must no longer be a function of L, and there is an increased chance that the failure event happens. We deal with this case by guessing a bound on T and L, and running the bounded T algorithm based on this guess. We call this an epoch of the algorithm. If at any point of the algorithm the users realize that this bound was under estimated, they double their guesses and run for another epoch, unless they have all successfully terminated. However, this approach requires that we increase the AMD encoding strength as well as the key lengths with the epochs, so that the adversary has decreasing chances of making the algorithm fail with the progressing epochs.
We set the length of epoch j ≥ 1 so that at most 6 2 j n 10 codewords can be exchanged in that epoch between any given pair of users 1 . This accounts to 6 2 j n 10 ( 219 log n + 32j) time steps in that epoch. Here, we use keys of length 3 log n + j, and append the AMD and ECC encoded message with sufficient number of random bits to make the total length 219 log n + 32j (refer to Fig.2 ). The AMD encoding strength is also uniform across this epoch, and is set to 4 −j n −14 .
We now describe an algorithm, based on the idea described above, that enables interactive communication between the users when the number of bits flipped by the adversary is unbounded, but finite, and the length L of the communication in π is unknown a priori to any user. This algorithm is presented in four parts as Algorithms 4, 5, 6 and 7. The first two algorithms describe Alice' and Bob's behavior, in the similar way to the bounded T case, while the last two describe the epochs and the general multi party case, respectively.
The only knowledge common to everyone at the beginning of the algorithm is the total number of users, n. Strictly speaking, our algorithm only requires that each user knows only who it's neighbors are along with this knowledge of n. Global knowledge of the network is not required, since we only consider communications between users and their neighbors. Multi hop message exchanges in π can be dealt here by splitting them into single hop exchanges and using an appropriate routing algorithm.
Algorithm 4
Message exchange algorithm for the sender (unbounded T and unknown L case)
1: procedure Alice(b, n, j) j is the epoch number.
2:
j ← 219 log n + 32j Length of encoded messages in this epoch.
3:
AMD encoding strength for this epoch.
4:
k a ∈ u.a.r {0, 1} 3 log n +j 5:
Send ecEnc (amdEnc ((KEY?, k a ) , δ j )) .
7:
while ¬ ( * , k a ) received from Bob 8:
k b ←Bob's key from the message.
9:
Send ecEnc (amdEnc ((b, k a ) , δ j )) .
10:
while not IsSilence (string on channel from Bob) do
11:
if Resend requested then
12:
13:
Stay silent.
15:
Terminate Algorithm 5 Message exchange algorithm for the receiver (unbounded T and unknown L case)
1: procedure Bob(n, j) j is the epoch number.
2:
AMD encoding strength for this epoch. Stay silent. k a ←Alice' key from the message.
9:
Send ecEnc (amdEnc ((k b , k a ) , δ j )) .
10:
while (KEY?, * ) received from Alice
11:
while ¬ ( * , k b ) received from Alice do
12:
Send ecEnc (amdEnc ((RESEND, k b ) , δ j )) .
13:
b ← bit retrieved from Alice' message.
14:
Terminate Algorithm 6 Algorithm for an epoch
epochLength ← 6 2 j n 10 ( 219 log n + 32j)
while epochLength time steps have not passed do 4:
User u executes ALICE(b, n, j).
6:
User v executes BOB(n, j).
7:
Remove (u, v, b) from A.
8:
Update A to include new messages from π.
9:
for each (u, v, b) ∈ A do 10:
Discard user v's knowledge of b so far.
11:
return A A contains rolled-back message exchanges Algorithm 7 Secure multiparty algorithm (unbounded T and unknown L case)
1: procedure MP-Main(π, n, U) U is the set of users and |U| = n.
2:
A ⊆ U × U × {0, 1} = {(u, v, b) | user u has the bit b ∈ π for his neighbor v} 3:
while A is not empty do
5:
A ← MP-Epoch(epochNum, n, A, π)
6:
epochNum ← epochNum + 1
7:
Terminate Notice the linear increase in the length of the messages exchanged over epochs. This enables the probability of failure to geometrically decrease with the epochs, enabling us to take a union bound over potentially unbounded number of epochs.
Unbounded T and L -Analysis
We now analyze the main algorithm as presented in Section 4. As in Section 3, we begin by computing the failure probability for the algorithm, by considering the three bad events as before, and then take a union bound over all the epochs. We will then compute an upper bound on the number of epochs in the algorithm, and use it to compute the number of bits the algorithm sends in expectation.
Probability of Error
Recall that for epoch j ≥ 1, each encoded message is of length j = 219 log n + 32j, which includes at least 157 log n + 20j random bits at the end. We define three bad events for an epoch :
1. Failure of AMD codes : The adversary is able to flip the bits to convert the message into another valid codeword. In this case, the affected users terminate the algorithm with the knowledge of bits which are not in π.
2. Conversion to silence : The adversary is able to flip bits in such a way that some user's random bits look like silence to his neighbor, resulting in the latter's premature departure.
3. Guessing the key : The adversary is able to guess the key for some user in an epoch and launch a man-in-the-middle attack.
We begin with some lemmas to prove our main result that the multiparty algorithm terminates successfully with probability 1 − O 1 n . Lemma 5.1. In epoch j ≥ 1, the Failure of AMD codes occurs with probability at most 6 2 j n 2 . Proof. In epoch j, the AMD failure probability for a single codeword is at most δ j = 4 −j n −14 . Since the maximum number of codewords exchanged in that epoch is 6 2 j n 12 , taking union bound over the number of codewords, the probability of AMD failure in epoch j is at most 6δ j 2 j n 12 = 6 2 j n 2 . Lemma 5.2. In epoch j ≥ 1, the Conversion to silence occurs with probability at most
Proof. In epoch j, Lemma 3.1 tells us that the probability that adversary is able flip the random bits of a codeword to forge silence is at most 2 − 157 log n +20j 19 ≤ 2 −20j/19 n −13 . Thus, taking a union bound over the maximum number of codewords in that epoch, we get that the probability of conversion to silence of a codeword in epoch j is at most 6n 2 2 j n 10 2 −20i/19 n −13 = 6 2 j/19 n . Lemma 5.3. In epoch j ≥ 1, the adversary is able to guess the key of some user with probability at most 2 2 j n .
Proof. In epoch j, keys are of length 3 log n + j. Each such key is generated uniformly at random from the set of all binary strings of this length. Thus, the probability of guessing this key is at most 2 −( 3 log n +j) ≤ 2 −j n −3 . Taking a union bound over all pairs of users and two keys per pair, the probability that the adversary is able to guess the key of some user is at most 2n 2 2 −j n −3 = 2 2 j n .
Lemma 5.4. Algorithm 7 terminates successfully with probability 1 − O 1 n . Proof. Algorithm 7 fails if any of the three failure events described above happen. From Lemmas 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, the total probability of failure is computed by using union bound over the three failure events over all the epochs, which is at most j≥1 Proof. Recall that each codeword sent by our algorithm is ECC encoded, which requires the adversary to flip a fraction of the total number of bits in every codeword that he intends to corrupt. Thus, the total number of codewords exchanged by the algorithm is O (L + T ).
Lemma 5.6. Algorithm 7, upon successful termination, sends O ((L + T ) log n (L + T )) bits in expectation.
Proof. Let r ≥ 1 be the index of the last epoch in which the algorithm sends a message between any pair of users. Recall that the maximum number of codewords exchanged in epoch j is 6 2 j n 12 . This upper limit on the number of codewords sent by the algorithm must respect the bound of Lemma 5.5, which gives, . Hence, the maximum length of a codeword in the algorithm is O (log n (L + T )). This implies that the total number of bits sent by the algorithm is bounded from above by the total number of codewords exchanged until r epochs, where each codeword is of length O (log n (L + T )). This bounds the number of bits sent by the algorithm by r j=1 6 2 j n 12 O (log n (L + T )) = O ((L + T ) log n (L + T )) .
Conclusion and Future Work
We have described the first algorithm in interactive communication for n users that deals with the case of unknown L while tolerating an unknown but finite amount of noise. Against an adversary that flips T bits, our algorithm compiles a noise free protocol π of length L into a robust protocol π that succeeds with high probability in n, and upon successful termination, sends O ((L + T ) log n (L + T )) bits in expectation. This result is optimal upto logarithmic factors of the optimal.
Several open problems remain including the following. First, can we adapt our results to interactive communication where π is a synchronous protocol? Second, can we more efficiently handle an unknown amount of stochastic noise, while making no assumption on the value of L? Finally, for any algorithm, what is the minimum number of private random bits required to be hidden from the adversary to achieve robustness?
